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GÖTTERDÄMMERUNG
BY LAWRENCE G. BAXTER ∗
In his panel remarks on the future direction of financial
regulation after the 2012 elections, Lawrence Baxter argues that the
age of large banks and “too big to fail” is destined to come to an end,
but not through the traditional avenue of governmental oversight.
Baxter starts by detailing the warning signs that illuminate the
unsustainable nature of the current financial model and moves to a
discussion on the deficiencies of modern banking regulations. Some
hope for an end to giant banking behemoths, Baxter finally posits, lies
in stricter market discipline and a realization that smaller, less-complex
banks provide returns that larger banks simply cannot match. It follows
that free-market principles will likely do more to reign in the size of
banks than regulation.
My eight-year-old son is named after an ancient Irish king. He
and I enjoy imagining the great adventures and heroism of ancient and
SciFi mythology—Lord of the Rings, Star Wars, King Arthur and the
Knights of the Roundtable, and the Ring of the Niberlungen. We like to
celebrate his diverse European ancestry, from which so many of these
legends are descended. One of his ancestral names is Volker. So with
particular delight—and not without some little alarm on his part—we
discovered that he can now trace his ancestry into the swirling mists of
such mythical characters as Volker the Strong, one of Siegfried’s
dragon slayers. Those familiar with Wagner’s cycle of four operas will
understand, therefore, why, when I think of the future of big banking, I
am drawn to the name of the last of those four operas, entitled
Götterdämmerung, or Twilight of the Gods.
Various developments suggest to me that the era of banking
behemoths may be drawing to a close. The long running battle over
whether the banks are “too big to fail,” “too big to manage,” “too
complex to regulate,” and “too big to jail” has not receded. Far from it,
∗ William B. McGuire Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University School of Law.
Apart from a few selected updates in the footnotes, these comments are current as of the
date of the Panel (Feb. 8, 2013).
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the debate has marshaled powerful and well-informed individuals on
both sides of the issues and on both sides of the Atlantic (and in THE
ATLANTIC! 1). It is not a debate that will be settled soon, for there is a
complicated case to be made on both sides. 2 Nevertheless, there also
appear to be signs that might portend some resolution and a slow
twilight of the era of large universal banking. I am hopeful that the most
important of these indications is coming from the markets themselves.
I. THE WARNING SIGNS
The full costs incurred by the large banks in the run-up to the
Crisis are now becoming evident as one scandal after another emerges.
Major banks (Deutsche and Barclays) are charged with having
concealed their financial conditions in 2008 to avoid government
intervention. 3 News of huge penalties for improper behavior far more
widespread than the occasional rogue trader—rate rigging, market
manipulation, facilitating money laundering, and tax evasion being the
most prominent examples—are almost a daily event. 4 Big banks have
1. See Frank Partnoy & Jesse Eisinger, What’s Inside America’s Banks?, THE
ATLANTIC,
Jan./Feb.
2013,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/01/whats-inside-americasbanks/309196/.
2. Lawrence G. Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of
Large Banks and Complex Finance, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 765 (2012).
3. See, e.g., David Jolly, German Authorities Are Said to Investigate Deutsche Bank,
available at
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Apr. 4, 2013, 6:18 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/german-authorities-are-said-to-investigatedeutsche-bank/ (Deutsche Bank); Tom Braithwaite, Kara Scannell & Michael Mackenzie,
Deutsche Hid Up To $12 Billion Losses, Say Staff, FIN. TIMES Dec. 5, 2012, available at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f03eb1d6-3efd-11e2-a095-00144feabdc0.html;
Daniel
Schäfer & Caroline Binham, Barclays in Qatar Loan Probe, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2013,
available
at
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/47d412ce-6bd1-11e2-a70000144feab49a.html#axzz2JZ8zTwBF (investigation into whether Barclays disguised a loan
to Qatar in order to facilitate the latter’s equity investment in Barclays for the purpose of
disguising Barclays’ capital position).
4. See, e.g., The LIBOR Scandal: The Rotten Heart of Finance, THE ECONOMIST, July
7, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21558281; Andrew Harris & Joe
Richter, Goldman Sachs, London Exchange Sued Over Aluminum Supply, BLOOMBERG,
Aug. 3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-02/goldman-sachs-londonexchange-sued-over-aluminum-supply-1-.html; Carrick Mollencamp et al., Special Report:
Documents Allege HSBC Money-Laundering Lapses, REUTERS, May 3, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/03/us-hsbcusa-probes-idUSBRE8420FX20120503;
Robert W. Wood, FATCA Cliff: Tax Evasion Guilty Plea and Death for Oldest Swiss Bank,
Jan.
3,
2013,
available
at
FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/01/03/global-banking-cliff-fatca-irs-guiltyplea-and-death-for-oldest-swiss-bank/.
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paid billions of dollars in quasi-criminal penalties and lawsuit
settlements. Even after reaching these settlements, the banks still have
not realized the end of their liabilities: big banks still face, for example,
continuing large class-action suits related to the foreclosure mess and
the fallout from Libor interest rate rigging. 5
Perhaps most importantly, more concrete calculations for
assessing the degree of public subsidy large banks enjoy have been
published and are being used in congressional hearings with powerful
effect. 6 Although the industry and even an undersecretary at Treasury
have denied that such subsidies exist or are significant, 7 their reasoning
has been either nonexistent or unpersuasive.
A combination of factors, particularly financial (to be addressed
more fully below), makes for difficult times for large financial
institutions. Even as bankers profess confidence in their ability to
weather the storms, a number of possibilities could precipitate the
sudden collapse of one or more big banks. 8 As we have seen, that
supposed paragon of risk management, JP Morgan Chase & Co., found
itself in choppy waters as a result of aggressive trading activity by its
“London Whale” group in London. 9 This has left many wondering what
5. See, e.g., Consent Judgment, United States of America v. Bank of America Corp.,
Case 1:12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 5, 2012) (national foreclosure settlement);
Complaint, Adams v. Bank of America Corp., Case 12-cv-07461-UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4,
2012) (LIBOR class action).
6. See, e.g., Kenichi Ueda and Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural
Subsidy Values for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 37 J. BANKING & FIN. 3830 (2013) (estimating
the structural value of government subsidy by exploiting expectations of state support
embedded in credit ratings).
7. Mary John Miller, Under Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks at the Hyman P.
Minsky
Conference
(Apr.
18,
2013)
(transcript
available
at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/Mary-Miller-speech.pdf).
8. The political consequences of such an event is acknowledged by one CEO opposed
to large bank breakups: the CEO of Zions Bancorp recently observed that the country’s
biggest banks are “one major misstep” away from being broken up. See Maria Aspan, Big
Banks ‘One Major Misstep’ Away from Breakup: Zions CEO, AM. BANKER, Mar. 14, 2013,
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_51/big-banks-one-major-misstep-away-frombreakup-1057552-1.html.
9. See, e.g., Dominic Rushe & Jill Treanor, US Prosecutors Charge Two JP Morgan
Traders over ‘London Whale’ Incident, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 14, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/14/us-prosecutors-jpmorgan-traderslondon-whale; see also HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS PERMANENT SUBCOMM.
ON INVESTIGATIONS, REPORT: JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY OF
DERIVATIVES
RISKS
AND
ABUSES
(MAR.
14,
2013),
available
at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades-a-case-historyof-derivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-2013.
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might have happened to less tightly managed institutions in similar
circumstances. It is not surprising, therefore, that observers are asking
whether we can safely assume that large modern banks have become too
complex to manage (and regulate).
The late John Medlin, then-CEO of Wachovia, once cautioned
me: “you never see the lightning that strikes you.” 10 The sheet lightning
on the horizon, however, is certainly visible, and I would suggest that a
deadly bolt from the blue may well come from the increasingly complex
web of technology on which modern banking now relies so heavily.
The same technology that has made so real the virtual world of global
finance, and levels of service, scale, and risk management undreamt of
only three decades ago, also carries with it great and often unexpected
dangers. 11
Last year the subsidiary of a major British bank, The Royal
Bank of Scotland, lost its ability to service customers for a lengthy
period of time—so much so that its CEO had to forego a large portion
of his compensation for the year. 12 This outage was the result of
problems in implementing a software upgrade. These kinds of
occurrences are far more common than the general public (and even the
regulators) often recognize. Indeed, they can occur no matter how
much advance planning and testing is undertaken, even in banks with
the most sophisticated of technology and operations centers.
Late last year, and repeatedly so far in 2013, major banks have
also endured substantial outages resulting from cyber attacks that are
probably state-sponsored—so much so that the industry has reversed
course from its previously anti-interventionist stance to ask for
government help. 13 President Obama has issued an executive order that
10. John Medlin served as CEO of Wachovia from 1977 to 1993 and as Chairman from
1988 to 1998.
11. Julie L. Williams, Common Breakdowns in Risk Management, PROMONTORY
SIGHTLINES
IN
FOCUS,
Mar.
4,
2013,
available
at
http://www.promontory.com/uploadedFiles/Articles/Insights/Promontory_Sightlines_InFoc
us_Risk_Management_130304_FINAL.pdf (“Simple, small errors can have outsized
consequences if they are repeated frequently enough — witness problems with mortgageforeclosure documentation. Supervisors have begun to ask whether large banks have other,
similar processes for other types of products. Firms with relatively straightforward but highvolume businesses of any sort should be mindful that the marginal risk of each transaction
over time can accrete, eventually constituting a messy problem.”).
12. See Simon Carswell, Ulster Bank Counts the Cost of Catastrophic IT Meltdown,
IRISH TIMES, Jul. 6, 2012, at 5.
13. See, e.g., Joseph Menn, Cyber Attacks against Banks More Severe Than Most
Realize,
REUTERS,
May
18,
2013,
available
at
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could have far-reaching impacts on the relationship between private
banking organizations and the national security network, and bills
addressing this issue have been revived in Congress. 14
Separately from well-known denial of service attacks on
banking web sites, there have also been reports of compromises of
customer data that have proved costly to financial institutions. And
these are the ones we know about. Hacker attacks are now a regular
occurrence, as hostile groups (perhaps sponsored by hostile foreign
governments) become more capable. Indeed, the attacks themselves
have become much more sophisticated, no longer comprising of bruteforce, denial-of-service attacks on servers, but rather intrusions that
target specific bank applications and customer access devices.
Technology has also stimulated new levels of competition that
might be more than our markets and human capability can handle. The
pervasive nature of computerized high-speed trading has reached
staggering proportions. The problems that arise when things go wrong
(not to mention the potential for market manipulations) can be
devastating. We have witnessed “flash crashes” arising from high speed
trading unintentionally misdirected by reason of faulty algorithms
and/or improper manipulation within the nanosecond bands now opened
up by the networks. Flash crashes are now also a much more common
occurrence than the public might realize. 15
In short, our enormous and complex financial institutions are
flying fast and high on the very technology that makes modern finance
possible but that also simultaneously adds major new vulnerabilities.
The risks incurred may well be worthwhile for the overall advancement
of humankind, but there is an important new factor: whereas we have
been able to withstand individual crashes in the past, the Crisis of 2008
has demonstrated that we cannot easily manage the contagion stemming
from the fact that the largest of our institutions are now so tightly
interconnected with each other and across financial systems that the
failure of any one of them could trigger the collapse of the system as a
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/18/us-cyber-summit-banksidUSBRE94G0ZP20130518.
14. Exec. Order No. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78 Fed.
Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
15. See Eric Hunsader, WIRED BUSINESS CONFERENCE 2013: THINK BIGGER (May 7,
2013),
http://fora.tv/2013/05/07/Nanex_CEO_Eric_Hunsader_Flash_Trading_Detective_Work.
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whole.
II. CAN REGULATION SAVE THE BANKS?
In enacting the Dodd-Frank Act and promoting international
cooperation, Congress, the implementing regulators, and the Basel
Committee for Bank Supervision (BCBS) have all pinned their hopes
for containing the risks of very big banks on a few major elements:
improving the ability to anticipate systemic financial crises; intensifying
the regulation of big banks; instituting structural reforms designed to
shield depositors and taxpayers from losses when institutions fail;
developing better mechanisms for “resolving” large financial
institutions when they run into financial difficulty; and extending the
safety net for depositors. While these strategies all sound appropriate in
theory, achieving their ambitions and implementing them in credible
ways without iatrogenic consequences is proving to be massively
difficult and divisive. The associated difficulties, as well as a record of
numerous earlier failures to take timely action even when regulators
were empowered to do so, have all contributed to the general sense of
disbelief when politicians and regulators declare that they have put an
end to the “too big to fail” problem.
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 16 and its
research arm, the Office of Financial Research, 17 have been hard at
work producing studies and reports to Congress, some of which have
added to our substantive understanding of how financial crises develop.
Yet hard decisions have so far been avoided or been very slow in
coming. It is difficult to believe that the FSOC framework, consisting
of the voting heads of ten different agencies could act quickly or in
unison, particularly in times of impending crisis. The FSOC has, for
example, taken a long time merely to designate nonbank systemically
important financial institutions (SIFIs): three years after the enactment
of Dodd-Frank only two have been designated, 18 while the appeal
16. The Financial Stability Oversight Council was created as part of the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
17. The Office of Financial Research was created as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 5342 (2012).
18. On July 8, 2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council voted to designate two
nonbank financial companies as SIFIs: American International Group, see Basis of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination Regarding American
(2013),
available
at
International
Group,
Inc.,
TREASURY.GOV
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process for a third has not yet been completed. 19
Attempts over the past few years to impose absolute size limits
on big banks have foundered. The codependence of the Treasury and
the banks themselves is simply too great to break through at this stage,
and even if there were stronger support for size restrictions no one has a
good answer for what the optimal size should be or whether reducing
the size of banks will eliminate the dangers posed by big finance
itself. 20 Regulators do indeed appear to be taking their cues from public
pressure (or perhaps they are becoming more concerned about what
would happen to them in the event of a large failure), and they are
reported to be placing great pressure on the big banks to reduce their
sizes and not undertake additional acquisitions. It is therefore possible
that further increases in scale are becoming practically impossible for
big banks.
On the other hand, a groundswell of bipartisan support for
applying more rigorous “speed limits of banking,” namely capital and
liquidity requirements, has been building. Various finance experts have
repeatedly emphasized that the historically low and wafer-thin levels of
capital banks now hold are simply too small to absorb the shocks
inherent in economic volatility. The entire Basel III framework and the
Collins Amendment in the Dodd-Frank Act are based on the assumption
that banking conglomerates simply have to have much greater lossabsorbency capacity, lower leverage and better quality capital. Many in
Congress and elsewhere consider these regulatory reforms to be
ineffectual and new bills imposing additional restrictions have been
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis
of
Final
Determination Regarding American International Group, Inc.pdf, and General Electric
Capital Corporation, see Basis of the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final
Determination Regarding General Electric Capital Corporation, Inc., TREASURY.GOV
(2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Basis
of Final Determination Regarding General Electric Capital Corporation, Inc.pdf.
19. See Danielle Douglas, Prudential Enters Unchartered Legal Realm by Appealing
POST,
Jul.
3,
2013,
its
Regulatory
Label,
WASH.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/does-prudential-have-a-chance-ofbeating-the-systemically-important-label/2013/07/03/9f3f22f8-e3ed-11e2-80eb3145e2994a55_story.html.
20. The essential difficulty is that it is not size alone that creates the problem. Rather,
it is the combination of size, extreme diversity of risks, multiple points of vulnerability,
intense interconnectedness, speed of business, economic pressure on bankers to produce
high short-term profits, and other factors that combine to produce the high levels of risk
involved with large-scale modern finance. This is why there is no “silver bullet” for solving
the problem.
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introduced. Even if these movements for reform fail to gain sufficient
momentum for passage, the regulators themselves appear to have taken
the hint, with the FDIC and even the OCC and the Fed demanding
greater capital and stricter liquidity requirements for larger banks.
All major financial centers have toyed with structural reforms
designed to separate more volatile risks from the basic business of
banking. In the United States, the Volcker Rule attempts to separate
banking from proprietary trading.
In the United Kingdom,
“ringfencing” reforms modeled on the Vickers Report 21 are designed to
shield depositor funds from high-risk activities within the banking
conglomerate. In Europe, the Liikanen Commission has proposed a
slightly different model. Yet such reforms, at least in the United States
and probably elsewhere, are problematic: not only are the separations
extremely difficult to implement in practice, but efforts to do so are
becoming labyrinthine in themselves, not least because the industry’s
own fierce resistance to any kind of meaningful reform has forced
regulators into ever-more-complicated rulemaking exceptions. The
convoluted results are themselves generating what one commentator has
aptly named “complexity risk.” 22
The industry, fearing more drastic reforms, now relies on the
argument that failures will be better handled than before as a result of
the new “orderly liquidation authority” introduced by Dodd-Frank. 23
This system involves two elements: first, the production by large
financial institutions of blueprints for their dissolution in times of
trouble (“living wills”); and second, a receivership regime, being
developed by the FDIC and foreign regulators, that would ensure that
the consequences of failure could be expeditiously contained both
within national financial systems and across borders. Considerable
21. TIMOTHY EDMONDS, THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING: THE VICKERS
REPORT (2013), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06171.pdf.
22. Karen Shaw Petrou, The Complexity-Risk Conundrum: Why SIFIs Can’t Be Both
Bullet-Proof and Profit-Making, Remarks Prepared for the Securities Industry & Financial
Markets
Ass’n.,
Jan.
10,
2012,
http://www.fedfin.com/images/stories/press_center/speeches/SIFMA_Speech.pdf.
The
Executive Director, Financial Stability of the Bank of England, Andy Haldane, has made a
similar point. See Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability & member of the Fin.
Pol’y Comm., Vasileios Maduoros, Economist, Bank of Eng., The Dog and the Frisbee,
Speech given at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 36th Economic Policy
Symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape,” Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2012),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/speeches/2012/596.aspx.
23. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394 (2012).
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work has been done both domestically and internationally. Large
financial institutions, domestic and foreign, have submitted various
rounds of living wills. The FDIC and the Bank of England have jointly
developed a “single point of entry” system for handling failures by
complex financial conglomerates. Yet the goal of a resolution system
that might match the complexities associated with failure by any global
financial institution remains distant. Even domestically, the FDIC’s
orderly resolution regime, though tested in various hypothetical
scenarios, has not yet been subjected to the fiery furnace of a real
failure, and there are many who remain skeptical that the system would
hold up.
To add to the morass, depositor guarantees have been hiked
dramatically during and since the 2008 Crisis, with retail deposit
insurance in the United States more than doubling to the very high level
of $250,000 per depositor per insured bank. Wholesale deposits were
also, in effect, accorded 100% guarantees through various “transaction
guarantee” programs. While intentions were honorable and designed to
prevent runs on the banks, the effect has been to generate greater moral
hazard than ever before, and thereby only intensifying the massive
distortions in the banking system and financial markets as a whole.
In short, efforts to promote financial stability through regulatory
techniques are halting, controversial, and might even prove ineffective
when financial instability returns, as it inevitably does. Given the
history of past and continuing regulatory failures, as well as the
enormity of the tasks facing regulators—especially considering
cutbacks in funding for agencies and the enormous influence of the
industry—it is hard after three full years of trying to find an informed
commentator who can say with confidence that we have fixed the
vulnerabilities that led to the Crisis of 2008 and that such a crisis will
not happen again. The task may simply be too complicated.
III. INCENTIVES, REWARDS, AND MARKET DISCIPLINE
If attempts by regulators to corral the big banks remain
unconvincing, perhaps there is still some light on the horizon coming
from what, in this commentator’s view, remains the ideal source (if it
can be allowed to work): market discipline.
Big banks are struggling to sustain their historical performance.

20-BAXTER (DONOTDELETE)

1/7/2014 2:43PM

100

[Vol. 18

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

Compensation has declined and long-term expectations relating to
returns on equity have been dramatically downgraded. Many bankers
blame regulation for this state of affairs. This argument is self-serving
and rather implausible given the ratio of regulatory expense to profits
and the strong short-term profits banks are still able to generate.
Stronger capital and liquidity requirements might have had a negative
influence on the short-term outlook, but the overall situation also has a
lot more to do with much broader economic conditions and a growing
perception that big universal banks simply cannot deliver the returns
they originally promised.
The markets themselves are developing explicit reservations.
On one hand, the steep discounts to book value that some of the leading
big banks now suffer have been explicitly ascribed to their inability to
generate value at the same pace as smaller and less-complex
counterparts. 24 The CEO of a firm that invests in banks, Joshua Siegel,
reportedly explained that, “smaller regional or community banks don’t
have the complexity that weighs down many of their larger peers, an
observation that helps to explain the steep discount to book value, or
reported net worth, in effect at Bank of America and Citigroup.” 25
Other prominent analysts, including some who have a powerful
influence on the markets such as Mike Mayo and Meredith Whitney,
have expressed similar sentiments. Just before this conference, Ms.
Whitney bluntly declared that:
For too long, banks have been viewed by investors as
“highly complex institutions” and because of this
mystique, bank chief executives and their boards have
justified obscene pay packages that ultimately hurt
overall shareholder returns. This year will be
particularly painful for bosses who try to perpetuate the
myth that running a bank is any different than running a

24. See Christine Harper, Bank Investors Press Breakups to Add Value, Burnell Says,
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 11, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/bank-investorspress-breakups-to-add-value-burnell-says.html (“So-called universal banks such as Bank of
America Corp., Citigroup Inc. and JPMorgan Chase & Co. are trading at a 25 percent to 30
percent discount to more-focused competitors[.]”)
25. Quoted by Suzanne Kapner & Shayndi Raice, Regionals Outplay Big Banks—
Latest Earnings Reports Illustrate Benefits of Simpler Businesses, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18,
2013, at C1.
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widget company. Complex accounting has made banks’
financial statements incredibly hard to read. The banks,
some with more than 75 pages of earnings details, have
done little to simplify results for investors. Making
things sound more complicated than they need to be has
not served the banks well. . . . For the past 20 years, an
American bank has been judged on its ability to get
bigger faster than its rivals. Only now will large US
banks will find themselves judged by how effectively
[sic] they are at getting smaller, leaner and more
profitable. 26
At the same time, market participants are complaining about the
incorrigible opacity, so well described by Frank Partnoy and Jesse
Eisinger in The Atlantic, of bank statements of financial condition.27
Paul Singer, head of the leading hedge fund Elliott Capital
Management, recently had a well-publicized confrontation with one of
the greatest titans of finance, Jamie Dimon, during which he (Singer)
was told by Dimon that the 400-page 10-Q should be enough for his
needs and that he did not need to know how the “engine” worked. 28 But
of course, as a hedge fund manager, Mr. Singer does need to know how
the “engine” works if he is going to manage his own risk properly. The
Financial Times reported that the opacity of which Mr. Singer
complained has “become a common criticism among both hedge fund
and institutional investors.” 29 What seemed to be not much more than
the sheet lightning of a distant but unthreatening storm has now begun
to build into investor movements to which big banks must pay
attention. 30 Some important regulators and commentators have
26. Meredith Whitney, US Bank Bosses Must Live Up to Their Pay, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2013.
27. Partnoy & Eisinger, supra note 1.
28. See, e.g., Heather Stewart, Jamie Dimon’s Defence of Bankers Won’t Fly,
BUS.
BLOG
(Jan.
23,
2013),
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2013/jan/23/jamie-dimon-jp-morgan-defence-ofbankers; Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan and Elliott Chiefs Clash in Davos,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9977e38c-655311e2-8b03-00144feab49a.html#axzz2THlECPIY.
29. Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan and Elliott Chiefs Clash in Davos,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9977e38c-6553-11e28b03-00144feab49a.html#axzz2THlECPIY.
30. For my early speculations, see Lawrence Baxter, Has The Great Big-Bank Die-Off
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suggested that component parts of some of the big banks are worth
more than their consolidated wholes. 31 Spin-off proposals have been
promoted for icons such as Barclays, 32 Citi, 33 and UBS. 34
These developments are encouraging. Given that expense
reductions can preserve returns on equity for only so long, and given
that more-focused competitors are producing better returns to investors,
it is entirely possible that investor attention will begin to turn from “toobig-to-fail” toward the real problem of “too-big-to-remain-profitable.”
Breaking up the banks is a proposition far easier said than done; indeed,
at this point, we really do not know what “safe” bank sizes should be or
what unintended consequences might accompany elimination of the big
banks. 35 As investors train their attention on the dysfunctional and
unprofitable nature of ultra-large, highly-complex financial institutions,
we might not be far from the day when we will witness a decline of
such gods of finance as they are forced naturally into breakups by
remorseless market pressures (much like the industrial conglomerates of
the 1980s).
Were these developments to gain momentum, and assuming no
unforeseen disaster beforehand (always a realistic concern), then
perhaps the markets will have corrected themselves more safely,
smoothly, and efficiently than could have happened in consequence of
haphazard and fractious political and regulatory attempts to impose this
correction themselves.
Begun?, SEEKING ALPHA, July 11, 2012, http://seekingalpha.com/article/715801-has-thegreat-big-bank-die-off-begun.
31. For a convenient summary of the diverse group that are beginning to hold this
view, see Washingtons Blog, Big Banks Worth More to Investors Broken Up, THE BIG
PICTURE (Apr. 18, 2013, 1:30 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2013/04/big-banks-worthmore-to-investors-broken-up/.
32. See, e.g., Patrick Jenkins & David Oakley, Investors Urge Jenkins to Split
Barclays, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2012, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/efae0c3635a6-11e2-bf64-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DKoGDW5e.
33. See, e.g., Aaron Elstein, In the Markets: Citi’s Parts Worth More than Whole,
N.Y.
BUS.,
Jul.
29,
2012,
CRAIN’S
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20120729/SUB/307299972http://www.crainsnewyor
k.com/article/20120729/SUB/307299972.
34. See, e.g., Ambereen Choudhury, UBS Should Split Investment Bank, Shareholder
Knight Vinke Says, BLOOMBERG, May 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0502/ubs-should-split-investment-bank-shareholder-knight-vinke-says.html;
Elena
Logutenkova, UBS Looks at All Investor Input on Knight Vinke Proposal, BLOOMBERG, May
3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-03/ubs-looks-at-all-investor-input-onknight-vinke-proposal.html.
35. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
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Thus might safely set the sun on the era of the giant universal
banks.

